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IMPLIED WARRANTY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
AND THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN CONTRACT
AND TORT
JAY M. FEINMAN*
An unusual type of products liability case raises the issue of whether an
injured consumer can recover for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code when the product that
causes the injury is not defective under the tort rules governing products
liability. Only a small number of cases fit this pattern, because in the
overwhelming majority of cases a product that is unmerchantable-that is,
not fit for the ordinary purposes for which it is used-will also be "in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous," to use the widely followed
language of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Nevertheless,
this type of case illuminates the nature of liability in implied warranty and in
products liability, the relationship between the two, the broader relationship
between contract law and tort law, the wisdom of portions of the proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability' and of the proposed revision
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the current politics of the
legal process.
I. LIABILITY IN IMPLIED WARRANTY AND IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Although the law of products liability is hardly uniform across the
country, a fair generalization is that strict liability in tort has triumphed over
breach of implied warranty in contract as the preferred cause of action in
products liability cases.2 In some cases, however, the strict liability action
fails because the product is not unreasonably dangerous under the applicable
tort rule. The victims in these cases may still seek a contract-based remedy
when the tort remedy fails, basing their actions on breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability. Courts and scholars have divided on whether the
implied warranty action should be available to the victim. One camp asserts
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden. My thanks to Carl Bogus
and Jean Braucher for their help.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13,
1995).
2. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The AL! Restatement
Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 647-49 (1995).
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that the warranty action has a residual role when the tort action is unavailable.
This position ("residual liability") is taken by the New York Court of Appeals
in Denny v. Ford Motor Co.3 and by the Drafting Committee of the Revised
Article 2 of the Code. The other camp argues that the strict liability tort
action has developed to such a degree that it is now exclusive of the warranty
action. This view ("exclusive liability") is proposed by Judge Simons,
dissenting in Denny, and the drafters of the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability.
5
The approach taken in Denny v. Ford Motor Co.' illustrates the residual
liability position. Nancy Denny was severely injured when the Ford Bronco II
that she was driving rolled over as she slammed on her brakes to avoid a deer.
Denny's evidence at trial demonstrated that "sport utility vehicles in general,
and the Bronco II in particular," are more prone to rollover accidents than
ordinary passenger cars.' Ford responded that the features that increased the
risk of rollover, such as a narrow track width and high center of gravity, were
necessary to the vehicle's off-road capabilities. The jury found that the
Bronco was not "defective" such that Ford was not liable on Denny's strict
products liability claim, but the jury did find that Ford was liable for breach of
an implied warranty.8
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified three
questions to the New York Court of Appeals:
(1) whether the strict products liability claim and the breach of implied
warranty claim are identical; (2) whether, if the claims are different,
the strict products liability claim is broader than the implied warranty
claim and encompasses the latter; and (3) whether, if the claims are
different and a strict liability claim may fail while an implied warranty
claim succeeds, the jury's finding of no product defect is reconcilable
3. 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).
4. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales (199.) § 2-319 n.3 (Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, July 12-19, 1996) [hereinafter July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2],
available at <http:llwww.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulclulc.htrn> (visited on Jan. 10, 1997); see also infra
note 31.
5. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 739 (Simons, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995); see also Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys.,
Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992) (allowing recovery for breach of warranty of merchantability but not
for strict liability).
6. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 730-33.
7. Id. at 732.
8. Id. at 732-33.
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with its finding of a breach of warranty.9
Ford argued that the strict liability and warranty claims were identical, and
therefore, the jury's verdict was internally inconsistent. As products liability
law has developed, Ford asserted, the tort action has supplanted the contract-
based action for breach of implied warranty.'"
Favoring a residual role for implied warranty, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the products liability and warranty actions are not the
same." To hold otherwise would "overlook[] the continued existence of a
separate statutory predicate for the breach of warranty theory and the subtle
but important distinction between [products liability and breach of warranty]
theories that arises from their different historical and doctrinal root."'12 The
warranty claim can survive even if the strict liability claim fails, so the jury's
finding that the Bronco was not defective but was unmerchantable could be
upheld. The establishment of a tort remedy for personal injuries caused by
defective products diminished the need to use the breach of implied warranty
theory, but the tort action did not completely subsume the warranty action. 3
Warranty actions originate in contract law, with its emphasis on disappointed
expectations, while strict liability originates in tort law, which is concerned
with "social policy and risk allocation by means other than those dictated by
the marketplace."' 4 The difference is reflected in the different concepts of
defect in each action: in strict liability, a negligence-oriented balancing test
asks whether the risks created by the product outweigh its utility, and in
warranty, the test asks whether the product is "fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used."'5 The difference is preserved by the
continued existence of a statutory remedy in the Uniform Commercial Code
that, in the absence of specific legislative revision,16 requires that the courts
continue to allow breach of warranty claims.
The facts in Denny show how the two theories of liability can diverge. The
jury found that the Bronco II was not defective; the features that made it
prone to roll over were necessary to its performance as an off-road vehicle
9. Id. at 733.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 734.
12. Id. at733.
13. Id. at 734.
14. Id. at 736.
15. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1995).
16. The court cited statutes in a number of other jurisdictions that specifically preempted residual
implied warranty claims. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 736-37.
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and the risk of rollover did not outweigh its utility for off-road use. 7
However, the "ordinary purpose" for which the Bronco was used was
everyday driving on paved roads. Because the Bronco was prone to rollover
accidents under ordinary conditions, it was not fit for its ordinary purpose,
thus breaching the implied warranty of merchantability. 8
The drafting committee for Revised Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code-but not, so far, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws-concurs with the result reached by the Court of
Appeals. 9 In the draft of Revised Article 2 prepared for the July 1996
meeting of the Conference, the Reporter, Professor Richard Speidel, and the
drafting committee, proposed to clarify implied warranty's residual role.2"
The drafters rejected making tort liability the exclusive remedy for product
injuries because of the lack of uniformity in products liability law among the
states, including states that make implied warranty the primary means of
imposing liability.2' Their solution was stated in proposed section 2-319(b):
"This [article] applies to a claim for injury to person or property resulting
from any breach of warranty to the extent that the goods are not defective
under other applicable law."'22
Proposed section 2-319(b) would codify the result in Denny. The drafters
suggested that "the relevant factors defining merchantability in section 2-
413(b) are broader than those defining defect in tort. '23 Accordingly, a victim
who has a strict tort liability claim may not also assert a breach of implied
warranty claim, but a victim who is injured by a product that is not, in tort
terms, defective, may still argue that the product is unmerchantable.24
17. Id. at 732-33
18. Id. at732-33, 738.
19. The Denny problem is one of many consumer protection issues that are being debated during
the redrafting of the Code. See generally Jean Braucher, Politics and Principle in the Drafling of UCC
Consumer Protection Provisions, 29 UCC L.J. 68 (1996).
20. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 4, § 2-319.
21. Id. § 2-319 n.3.
22. Id. § 2-319(b). Other parts of section 2-319 limit the definitions of "person" and "property"
for purposes of the section and state rules for the application of the distinctive features of warranty law
to personal injury and property damage cases. See id. § 2-319(a).
23. Id. § 2-319 n.3. The proposed revision makes a slight change in the relevant section 2-314
standard: "be fit for the ordinary purposes for which [such] goods of that description are used." Id. § 2-
314(b)(3) (currently U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1995)).
24. At the July 1996 meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, this proposed section was withdrawn by the drafting committee for reconsideration because of
opposition to it from several quarters. Interview with Professor Amelia H. Boss, Member of Drafting
Committee, NCCUSL (July 25, 1996).
[VOL. 75:469
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Arguing that a strict liability action excludes a warranty claim, Judge
Simons dissented in Denny. He argued that the risk/utility test of products
liability was broader than the expectation-based standard of warranty law, and
thus should exclude the application of that standard in a personal injury
action. Products liability arose from the interaction of contract and tort law
but now stands independently:
The law imposing liability without fault against those making and
marketing consumer products evolved in stages, progressing from
negligence to implied warranty and eventually to the adoption in New
York of a new cause of action known as strict products liability....
This new cause of action was not separate from implied warranty
but an amalgam which had been constructed by the courts to establish
a cause of action for liability without fault by merging warranty
concepts (to avoid fault analysis) with negligence concepts (to avoid
privity). The new cause of action recognized products liability as a
discrete area of tort law, which borrows from both negligence and
warranty, and attempts to avoid the confusion spawned by trying to
categorize the various claims and remedies under prior law. It imposes
strict liability as a matter of social policy predicated on the idea that
defendants ought "to pay for the costs attributable to damaging events
caused by defects of a kind that made the product more dangerous than
it would otherwise be"....
Moreover, the reference to consumer expectations inherent in implied
warranty has been generally rejected in products liability law. Consumer
expectations are part of the sales law, in which a seller agrees to indemnify a
buyer if the goods do not measure up to the bargain. In the realm of personal
injury and strict products liability, however, the concern for product safety
dictates a balancing of a product's risks and benefits under the risk/utility test.
The drafters of the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability take an even more extreme view than Judge Simons. Section 2(b) of
the proposed Restatement substantially narrows the test for design defect:
a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
25. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 740-41 (Simons, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
1997]
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posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution,
and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe... 26
Although section 2 of the proposed Restatement and the process by which it
has been drafted and considered have been enormously controversial, the
American Law Institute gave tentative approval to the section at its 1995
Annual Meeting.
27
The standard in section 2 is a version of the risk/utility test that is
equivalent to negligence liability.2 It requires that the plaintiff prove that a
reasonable alternative design that would have prevented the injury was
available to the manufacturer at the time the product was made. It explicitly
rejects the consumer expectations test that some courts have used as an
alternative to risk/utility analysis. Instead, it consigns consumer
expectations-and, implicitly, the broader concept of product
representation-to one element of a list of "[a] broad range of factors [that]
may legitimately be considered in determining whether an alternative design
is reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not reasonably
safe."29 Accordingly, section 2 diminishes the effect of the representational
concepts of manufacturer liability in products liability actions.
The proposed Restatement makes the standard for liability for a
defectively designed product under section 2 exclusive of all other liability
rules. Whether the action is brought in strict liability, negligence, or implied
warranty of merchantability, the "reasonable alternative design" standard of
section 2 controls-.3 Section 2 effectively eliminates breach of implied
warranty as a residual cause of action in personal injury cases. The belief
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
13, 1995).
27. Continuation of Discussion of Restatement of the Lmv Third, Torts: Products Liability, 72
A.L.I. PROC. 201, 230 (1995). For discussion of the proposed Restatement, see A Symposium on the
ALI's Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1043 (1994); and
Symposium, The Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Occasion for Reform
of Product Liability Law?, 10 TOURO L. REV. 1 (1993).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmts. a, c (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1995).
29. Id. § 2 cmt. e.
30. Id. § 2 cmt. m & rptr.'s note. Professor Gray describes this as "a proposition of breathtaking
audacity." Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALI Product Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachronism?, 61
TENN. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1994) (discussing commentj).
(VOL. 75:469
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underlying exclusive liability is that "it is monstrous for the law to be talking
out of both sides of its mouth," by permitting representational liability under
warranty while prohibiting it on the same facts in products liability as ALI
Director Geoffrey Hazard commented.3' However, because the ALI has not
considered revised Article 2, section 2-319 and Professor Speidel's response
to Hazard--"We are not talking out of both sides of the mouth if you have a
vibrant theory of contract that protects expectations, as opposed to a tort
theory that focuses on other factors"32 -- are still open for consideration.
II. THE BROADER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACT LAW AND
TORT LAW
One of the most interesting things about the scholarly and judicial
attempts to deal with the relationship between implied warranty theory and
products liability is the recognition that the appropriate solution depends on
more than a strong doctrinal or policy argument about the particular issue.
Everyone who deals with the problem understands that it implicates the
broader relationship between contract law and tort law. By focusing on that
broader issue, I will suggest why different people reach different conclusions
on the narrower issue, how the narrower issue ought to be resolved, and what
is at stake in the controversy.
The proponents of the different positions start from a shared vision of the
doctrinal structure of contract and tort law. Contract and tort are different in
their objectives and their subject matter. Contract law is concerned with
relations that are created primarily by affirmative promissory acts that plan
for the future conduct of the contracting parties. Tort law, on the other hand,
seeks to remedy wrongful violations of established interests that are not
created by agreement, particularly interests that concern the physical integrity
of person or property. Accordingly, as the Denny majority stated, "contract
law... directs its attention to the purchaser's disappointed expectations; ...
tort law ... traditionally has concerned itself with social policy and risk
allocation by means other than those dictated by the marketplace." '33 Contract
law focuses on reasonable expectations and reasonable reliance raised by a
promise (on the plaintiff's side) and on the social value of honoring one's
31. Report on the Uniform Commercial Code, Revised Article 2, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 419, 430 (1995)
[hereinafter U. C. C. Report].
32. Id.
33. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730,736 (N.Y. 1995).
19971
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obligations (on the defendant's side). Conversely, tort law is concerned with
compensating for harm (on the plaintiffs side) caused by the wrongful act of
another (on the defendant's side). Contract protects the plaintiff's expectation
and reliance interests to promote initiative and to provide security in
commercial activity. Tort is concerned with accident avoidance and efficient
and appropriate allocation of risk.
This doctrinal structure is so familiar that it hardly needs explanation.
Simply stating its basic elements evokes the structure that lawyers internalize
from their first semester in law school and implement in virtually every
contract and tort case. At the same time, it has become widely recognized that
the doctrinal structure is limited or deficient in certain respects.34 Neither the
criteria that we use to separate contract cases from tort cases nor the policies
and values implemented in each area are as starkly different as the initial
description suggests. Denny illustrates the underlying problem. Nancy Denny
arguably was injured in two respects: by Ford's disappointment of her
expectations about the performance of her Bronco, and by Ford's creation of
an unreasonable risk of harm to her. Thus, the facts that trigger both contract
and tort inquiry are present, and the policies of both contract and tort law are
at least potentially involved. Simply put, contract and tort overlap, and cases
such as Denny lie in the area covered by both.
Consider how the different positions on the availability of implied
warranty actions in personal injury cases deal with the overlap of contract and
tort. Both the advocates of residual liability and the advocates of exclusive
liability recognize the overlap and sharpen the differences between the two
subjects, but they do so in very different ways.
Advocates of residual liability embrace the overlap when they allow the
application of either contract law or tort law to a case. The policies of tort
law-notably deterrence, compensation, fairness, and loss-spreading-permit
the application of strict liability, but they do not bar the application of the
policies of contract law, particularly the protection of legitimate expectations,
in an appropriate case.
There is nothing about contract law generally which says we shouldn't
have personal injury liability.35
34. See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661
(1989).
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[T]he beauty of [section] 402A and the 1990 text of the Uniform
Commercial Code is that, if you had goods that caused damage to
person or property, it might either be tort or warranty or both. There
was no preemption. Plaintiffs had a choice to pick one or the other or
both, and there was no attempt to dictate by warranty that it can't be
tort or vice versa.36
Advocates of exclusive liability also emphasize the differences between
contract and tort, but to a different purpose. Although the two subjects
overlap, each subject has a primary sphere of application within which its
policies govern to the exclusion of the other. The essential facts of a case
determine whether it falls within the primary sphere of application of contract
law or tort law. If the case involves a bargain transaction between two parties,
it is a matter for contract law. If it involves an accidental injury to person or
property, it falls to tort law.
[UIt seems to me that the correct way to approach [the issue] is to say
what should be the terms of liability for personal injury, the premise
being that that's a different kind of injury than an economic or
commercial injury.37
There is another way of dealing with the overlap of contract and tort.
Instead of thinking of these cases as instances of the broad categories of
contract or tort, we might construct a narrower, separate area. This is, of
course, what has been done over the past fifty years in the creation of
products liability. As Judge Simons noted in Denny, the law of products
liability is an "amalgam" of contract and tort concepts, in which elements are
drawn from each area and transformed into something new and more
appropriate for the particular kinds of cases at issue.3" This is the theory
behind the current Restatement project, that products liability merits treatment
as the first, and for perhaps the foreseeable future, the only portion of tort law
that requires a new restatement.
As a general matter, I believe that reconstructing traditional doctrinal
structures is long overdue, especially in the area covered by the common-law
trivium of contracts, torts, and property. This move is related to a relational
36. U.C.C. Report, supra note 31, at 426-27 (quoting Professor Richard E. Speidel).
37. Id. at 428 (quoting Director Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.). For the same position on a different
doctrinal issue, see William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209 (1994).
38. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 741.
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approach to legal analysis. In deciding any case, we ought to begin by
focusing on the relationships in the factual setting that gives rise to the case,
recognizing that the relationships often will be more complex than is
acknowledged by the traditional categories. Focusing on those relationships
often leads us to see the advantage of constructing new categories, such as
"products liability" or "economic negligence."39
Recasting the doctrinal structure can be a major improvement, but it does
not necessarily solve the particular doctrinal problem. In creating a new area
out of existing ones, we must take pains to ensure that the relevant elements
of the underlying relationships, which may have been expressed in the
previous categories, are not lost in the reconstruction. Also, constructing the
categories is not simply a matter of projecting from the facts and
relationships; there are choices to be made in the process, and the choices
depend on one's values and orientation to the issues involved.
In the overlap between implied warranty and products liability, Judge
Simons and the drafters of the proposed Restatement have appropriately
focused on the category of "products liability" as relatively independent of its
roots in contract and tort. Beyond that first step, however, I believe that they
have gotten it very wrong. This is particularly true of the Restatement
drafters, who link exclusive liability in tort with a new formulation of the
rules of product liability that shift us from strict liability to negligence, and a
narrow form of negligence at that. They have lost sight of some of the
important roots of products liability, because they have followed their own
values, values that are inconsistent with the bulk of the law and its spirit. In
the discussion that follows, therefore, I focus on the problems with the
proposed Restatement draft because they are more extreme than those in
Judge Simons's dissent.
First, the advocates of exclusive liability who authored the proposed
Restatement slight the representational concerns that have been an essential
element of products liability. Under section 2(b), for example, "consumer
expectations do not constitute an independent standard for judging the
defectiveness of product designs."'4 Instead, they are only one of the factors
that go to "the necessity for, or the adequacy of, a proposed alternative
39. See JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONALS AND
BUSINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC Loss 177-208 (1995); Feinman, supra note 34, at 712-
16.
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design."' The consumer expectations test for product defect has been
controversial, mostly when it has served as an exclusive rather than a partial
test for liability, but it still figures in the law in many states.42
More broadly, the focus on risk/utility as the exclusive measure of
unreasonable danger, and particularly the requirement of a reasonable
alternative design, 3 pay insufficient attention to the representational basis of
products liability. "[T]he portrayal of the product which is made, caused to be
made or permitted by the seller' is crucial to the evaluation of the product.
A Bronco II is unreasonably dangerous not only because it is prone to
rollover accidents in ordinary driving, but because it is prone to those
accidents and it is represented by the manufacturer and its dealers and
understood by the public to be suitable for ordinary driving, in which
excessive rollovers are not to be expected.
Second, the Restatement has abandoned the roots of product liability in
protecting consumers from harm by imposing strict liability rather than
negligence. As Professor Shapo noted, "[T]he Reporters have severed the
black letter of products liability from its moorings, most centrally 30 years of
judicial development under § 402A, and . . . perhaps they have even
unmoored it from the general body of tort law and even from relevant
contract law."'4
Since 1960, products liability has exploded, and the explosion has been
based on what Professor Carl Bogus called "Cardozo's Paradigm," after the
41. Id.
42. See Howard Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the Consultative
Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1173 (1994); see also e.g.,
Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994); Camacho v. Honda Motor Corp., 741 P.2d
1240 (Colo. 1987).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No.2,
Mar. 13, 1995).
44. Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory ofConsumer Protection: Doctrine, Function
and Legal Liabilityfor Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1370 (1974) (in statement of
the thesis).
45. Discussion of Restatement ofthe Law Third, Torts: Products Liability, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 179,
182 (1995); see also Joseph W. Little, The Place ofConsumer Expectations in Product Strict Liability
Actions for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1994) ("Gone is the notion
that where a product is determined by law to be unreasonably dangerous (or 'not reasonably safe') for
users, consumers, and bystanders, a seller places such a product in the market at the seller's peril,
notwithstanding the inability of plaintiffs to prove a better design or more effective warning."). See
generally Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265 (1994); Frank J. Vandall, The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design
Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407 (1994).
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author of Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co.46
The concern is not so much whether the product had a flaw,
irregularity, or other shortcoming that caused it to perform differently
than the purchaser expected as it is with the consequences of the
product. The focus is wider. It is not restricted to the bipolar
relationship between seller and purchaser. A product may be
unreasonably dangerous because it places others-nonpurchasers and
even nonusers-at risk. The analysis encompasses all of the social
benefits and costs which result from the product....
Those who subscribe to Cardozo's Paradigm focus on societal
rather than individual consequences. For them, products liability
primarily serves as a deterrent to distributing unsafe products.47
Limiting the test for defective products to risk/utility, particularly the
narrow version of risk/utility in the proposed Restatement, rejects this history
by substituting a restricted version of the negligence test that the courts have
consistently rejected.48 As Professor Shapo explains:
[A]nother idea supporting the development of Section 402A
inheres in the supposition that the traditional negligence rules of proof
create hurdles that are too high for many plaintiffs with meritorious
cases. The [Restatement] Draft accepts this point concerning
manufacturing defect cases. With its requirement that plaintiffs show a
reasonable alternative design, it implicitly rejects it in design cases....
In general, the Draft at least implicitly raises the question of
whether Section 402A is too generous in its commitment to consumer
protection. It seems to imply that this is so, and that consumers are
46. Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability,
60 Mo. L. REv. 1, 15 & n.54 (1995) (discussing the paradigm from Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)).
47. Id. at 15-16 (footnotes omitted).
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.
2, Mar. 13, 1995) ("Subsections (b) and (c) of § 2 rely on a reasonableness test traditionally used in
determining whether an actor has been negligent.").
[VOL. 75:469
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better able to take care of themselves than the Institute believed when
it adopted Section 402A.49
I conclude, therefore, that as a conceptual matter the most desirable path
would be to reformulate the structure of legal doctrine to continue to focus on
products liability. But the new structure must take adequate account of the
traditional objectives of the area (prominently including protection against
unsafe products) and of its basic principles (recognizing the significance of
product representation). This solution would require rejecting the proposed
Restatement draft. Although that war has not yet been lost, it is at best
difficult to win the battle on the floor of the ALI at this stage of the game.
Whether the courts will follow suit is another matter; in my judgment, the
courts ought to reject the new Restatement if it is adopted as proposed. The
next-best solution, I believe, would be either to adopt the proposed section 2-
319 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which preserves the representation
emphasis of products liability within contract rather than in a separate subject,
or to reach the same result without a specific statutory mandate, as in Denny
v. Ford Motor Co.
III. THE CONTRACT-TORT OVERLAP IN OTHER AREAS
Taken on its own terms, the Denny problem is relatively limited, arising in
a small number of cases. Looked at more broadly, it illustrates approaches to
the overlap of contract and tort. In recent years, the overlap problem has been
addressed in a number of other areas as well, in ways that are related to the
approaches to the Denny problem. I will mention three such areas: so-called
"tort reform," product-related economic loss, and breach of contract as a tort.
The first example, tort reform, has been one of the most controversial
issues in private law during recent years, as advocates for business and
insurance interests have pressed for numerous cutbacks in the tort liability
system. For example, Peter Huber of the Manhattan Institute has written
prolifically about the problems of tort law and the need for change.50 The
problem, according to Huber, is that scholars and judges have expanded tort
law to encroach upon the sphere of private transactions properly governed by
contract.5' The solution is to permit and encourage "neocontracts" by which
49. Shapo, supra note 2, at 689-90 (footnote omitted).
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private agreements will replace tort liability.52
Huber begins with the familiar distinction between tort and contract. "Tort
law is the law of accidents and personal injury"" of which a car accident
between strangers is the most common example. But injuries between
strangers are relatively rare; "most unintended injuries occur in the context of
commercial acquaintance."54 In commercial relationships in which the parties
can bargain in advance, the law traditionally encouraged agreements that
dealt with potential risks. "Most accidents were handled under the broad
heading of contract-the realm of human cooperation-and comparatively
few relegated to the dismal annex of tort, the realm of unchosen relationship
and collision."'55 The allocation of cases reflected fundamental and desirable
differences between the areas of law.
Contract, the mirror image of tort, is the law of cooperation ....
Contract is the right that supports all others, most especially in a
modem technological society with highly specialized production. It is
through voluntary agreement that we control our own bodies ...
control our social universe ... and control our spiritual destiny .... In
a well-ordered world, the mutual benefits that are possible through
cooperation would favor it unconditionally.
Tort law, however, sharpens every possible difference or
suspicion .... Tort law magnifies conflict to the point where it
swamps the benefits of cooperation.56
The desirable distinction between contract and tort law was lost as the
founders of modem liability law-"the likes of' Prosser, Wade, and
Traynor-shifted attention to the problem of allocating and minimizing the
costs of accidents and providing victims with compensation through tort
law.57 The result has been a transformation of the law that imposes both a
massive tax on consumers through mandatory tort liability that cannot be
bargained away through contract and a concomitant loss of individual
freedom.
The solution to this social problem is to reinstate contract to its position as
52. See id. at 194-96.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id at 189.
57. Id. at 6-7.
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the paramount private law subject. "The guiding principle must be to promote
consent and agreement wherever possible-to prefer contract over tort
whenever the choice may be presented-and to elevate [contractual] direct
insurance over liability-driven compensation. ' 58 Parties could contract in
advance for the level of care and compensation that they desired. An airline
and its passengers, for example, could include in each ticket a binding
insurance contract that would replace the passengers' actions against the
airline in case of a crash. 9 "In the end, compensation clothed in the working
garb of contract is far more beautiful than tort dressed up in China silks,
cashmere shawls, and Golconda diamonds, because the attire of contract is
affordable, earned, and paid for, not just seized from others by the
compulsion of misguided law."
The second example of the overlap of contract and tort law is product-
related economic loss. It is the reverse of the Denny situation, and is presented
in cases in which a buyer of goods suffers purely economic loss but seeks a
remedy in tort law, particularly products liability, rather than contract
warranty law.6' The prevailing view in cases of this type bars the use of the
tort action even when the contract action is unavailable. The leading cases in
this area are Seely v. White Motor Co.62 and East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc.63
In Seely, the commercial purchaser of a truck discovered that the truck
bounced violently. The dealer was unable to correct the problem, even with
guidance from the manufacturer's representative. The court allowed the
purchaser to recover from the manufacturer the portion of the purchase price
he had paid as damages for breach of express warranty and lost profits as
consequential damages.' This decision was an early step in surmounting the
privity barrier for remote purchasers in actions against manufacturers,
particularly because the court did not require proof of reliance on the
warranty.65 However, in the more widely cited portion of the opinion, the
58. Id. at 193.
59. Id. at 194.
60. Id. at 225-26.
61. See FEINMAN, supra note 39, at 495-554.
62. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) (en bane).
63. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
64. Seely 403 P.2d at 147-48.
65. Indeed, the purchaser did not know that the warranty came from White rather than the dealer.
Id. at 144-48.
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court refused to allow a claim stated in strict liability.66 The primary basis of
the California court's rejection of strict liability was a distinction between the
body of law governing personal injury claims and the law governing
economic loss.
[T]he law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the
economic relations between suppliers and consumers of goods. The
history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was
designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or
of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct
problem of physical injuries.67
The manufacturer in Seely was liable because its express warranty
determined the quality of the product that it was obligated to deliver. If it
were strictly liable, however, it might be liable for losses due to uses of the
truck that it could not anticipate. Only where the parties have agreed as to the
buyer's economic expectations is a manufacturer liable for disappointing
those expectations. The expectation of safety from physical injury caused by
the product, on the other hand, is one that a consumer is entitled to have even
in the absence of agreement. The court distinguished between personal injury,
the calamitous consequences of which strict tort liability is designed to
prevent, and economic loss, which is governed by the law of contract.68
The United States Supreme Court adopted and extended the principles of
Seely in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., an
admiralty case.69 In East River, the charterers of several ships (who were
affiliated companies of the owners and other contracting parties) brought an
action against Transamerica Delaval, which had defectively manufactured
and installed the turbines in the ships.7" Like the previous courts, the Supreme
Court concluded that contract warranty law was the appropriate body of law
to protect the buyer's economic expectations.7' Contrary to Seely, however,
the Court also extended that principle to physical damage to the defective
product.
Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt,
66. Id. at 149-50.
67. Id. at 149.
68. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151-52.
69. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
70. Id. at 859-60.
71. Id. at 872-73.
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accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased
value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to
receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core concern of
contract law.72
Only personal injury or damage to property other than the product itself
would activate the tort principles of products liability law.
The third example, one of the issues on which the conflict between
contract and tort law has been most contested, concerns when a breach of
contract also constitutes a tort. The issue arises in cases of bad faith breach
and negligent breach.
It is hornbook law that every contract includes an obligation of good faith
performance. In many jurisdictions, breach of the good faith obligation has
been argued as a basis for tort recovery beyond the damages permitted in
contract. The California story is the best known. It began with a series of
insurance cases, expanded for a time to employment cases, potentially
included general commercial contracts, and then contracted severely in Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp.,73 a case that relied on the prevailing model of
contract and tort law.
The early insurance cases in California rested on an insurance company's
"failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements" of claims against
its insureds, "a duty included within the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."74 Subsequently, the insurer's specific obligations were
generalized into a duty to "act fairly and in good faith in discharging its
contractual responsibilities."75 A breach of that duty could result in "a cause
of action in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."'76 Decisions of the lower courts extended the availability of the tort
cause of action from insurance cases to employment and banking cases, and
dictum in the California Supreme Court's decision in Seaman's Direct
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.77 suggested that tort liability might
expand into general commercial contracts.
However, in Foley the California Supreme Court precluded the
application of the bad faith tort to the employment area and effectively
72. Id. at 870.
73. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
74. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967) (en bane).
75. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973) (en bane).
76. Id
77. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (en bane).
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foreclosed its expansion to other areas as well.78 At one level, the court's
opinion was motivated by a model of tort and contract.79 The opinion rested
on a perception of the difference between tort and contract law and on the
origins of the obligation of good faith in contract law. The court reasoned:
The distinction between tort and contract is well grounded in
common law, and divergent objectives underlie the remedies created in
the two areas. Whereas contract actions are created to enforce the
intentions of the parties to the agreement, tort law is primarily designed
to vindicate "social policy." The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was developed in the contract arena and is aimed at making
effective the agreement's promises.8"
Because the obligation of good faith is a contract term, its scope in any
particular case depends on the intentions of the parties and the reasonable
expectations created by their contract, and contract damages, not tort
damages, provide the appropriate remedy for such a breach.'
The insurance bad faith cases constituted an exception to this rule because
of the unique characteristics of the insurance relationship. Through the
insurance relationship, the insured seeks protection against calamity, not
commercial advantage. 2 The relationship is an inherently unequal one, in
which the insured typically has no ability to bargain for terms and is at the
insurer's mercy in case a claim is made. The insurance company provides a
quasi-public service and has more responsibilities to its insureds than does an
ordinary contracting enterprise." In shor the distinctive features of the
insurance relationship remove it from the model of contract; the harm that can
be visited upon the subordinate insured by the dominant insurer is tortious by
default.
84
78. Foley, 765 P.2d at 389-401.
79. Id. At another level, the decision was motivated by what one could reasonably describe as
politics; the composition of the court had changed dramatically and several of its liberal justices were
removed by the electorate and replaced with conservatives.
80. Id. at389 (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 390 ("As a contract concept, breach of the duty led to imposition of contract damages
determined by the nature of the breach and standard contract principles.").
82. Id.
83. Id. (citation omitted).
84. The denouement of the California story came recently in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher
Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995). The majority of the California Supreme Court overruled Seaman's
Direct because of "uniform confusion and uncertainty regarding its scope and application, and
widespread doubt about the necessity or desirability of its holding" without much discussion of the
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In the bad faith cases, plaintiffs attempt to use the contractual obligation of
good faith performance as the basis for a tort action. In cases of negligent
breach of contract, plaintiffs even more ambitiously seek to transform the
breach of any contractual obligation into a tort.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. DeLanney85 is typical of a line of
cases that illustrates the approaches to this problem. DeLanney was a business
owner who advertised in the Yellow Pages directory published by
Southwestern Bell.86 Due to an error in its internal procedures, Bell
negligently deleted DeLanney's advertisement from the 1980-81 directory.
87
Under the standard contract for directory advertising, Bell's liability to
DeLanney was limited to a refund of the amount paid for the advertisement
so DeLanney sued in tort, alleging negligence.88
The Texas authority and scholarly commentary relied on by the court
delineated the distinctions between contract and tort actions. Where the
defendant agreed to repair a water heater in the plaintiffs home and did so
negligently, causing the heater to start a fire that destroyed the house and its
contents, the action lay in tort because a common-law duty to act reasonably
to avoid physical harm exits independent of the contract.89 Negligently failing
to publish a Yellow Pages advertisement is different, though.
If the defendant's conduct-such as negligently burning down a
house-would give rise to liability independent of the fact that a
contract exists between the parties, the plaintiffs claim may also sound
in tort. Conversely, if the defendant's conduct-such as failing to
publish an advertisement-would give rise to liability only because it
breaches the parties' agreement, the plaintiffs claim ordinarily sounds
only in contract.
In determining whether the plaintiff may recover on a tort theory, it
is also instructive to examine the nature of the plaintiffs loss. When
contract-tort boundary. Id. at 679. Justice Mosk concurred in the result but dissented from the
overruling of Seaman's Direct in an opinion that examined the boundary at length. Id. at 680-89
(Mosk, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).




89. Id. at 494 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 204 $.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex.
1947), and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 655 (5th
ed. 1984)).
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the only loss or damage is to the subject matter of the contract, the
plaintiff's action is ordinarily on the contract....
The acts of a party may breach duties in tort or contract alone or
simultaneously in both. The nature of the injury most often
determines which duty or duties are breached. When the injury is
only the economic loss to the subject of a contract itself the action
sounds in contract alone.
Bell's duty to publish DeLanney's advertisement arose solely from
the contract. DeLanney's damages, lost profits, were only for the
economic loss caused by Bell's failure to perform. Although
DeLanney pleaded his action as one in negligence, he clearly sought to
recover the benefit of his bargain with Bell. We hold that Bell's failure
to publish the advertisement was not a tort.... DeLanney's claim was
solely in contract.90
IV. CONCLUSION
We might draw a number of different conclusions from the combination
of these other developments and the Denny problem.
We might view this struggle in a positive light. These are difficult,
perhaps intractable, problems. The courts and scholars have done an
admirable job of trying to resolve them. In the cases and the literature, we see
an increasingly sensitive examination of the principles of contract and tort
law, the relationship of those principles to the institutional strengths and limits
of the legal system, and the ways in which the conflict of the two areas can
best be reconciled consistent with those principles and institutional factors.
Scholars and judges have concluded that each subject has its main sphere of
influence, with a troublesome but limited gray area in between. Several of the
solutions are symmetrical; because contract reigns where bargaining is
possible and tort reigns where it is not, East River bars tort actions in
commercial cases and the proposed Restatement bars contract actions in
personal injury cases.9 '
Or we could take a negative view of the process. Despite all the
examinations of the issue, we continually are thrown back on traditional
90. Id. at 494-95 (citations and footnotes omitted).
91. See supra notes 26-32, 69-73 and accompanying text.
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views of the subjects and formulaic categorizations of the settings. Contract is
about bargaining among free individuals; tort is about accidents to people
who can't bargain. In every setting but the most extreme, bargaining is
available, so the law ought to limit its intervention through tort law.
Or we could combine this examination of an "internal" perspective-a
perspective that focuses only on the common-law process-with
consideration of a set of "external" factors that might shed further light on
what is going on in this area.' To list only a few relevant factors outside the
common-law process that ought to evoke the whole picture:
" Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980 largely with the
promise of lifting "government off the backs of the people." The
two basic means of accomplishing this end were to cut taxes and
decrease government regulation of the economy.
" The Republican Congress elected in 1994, under the leadership of
Newt Gingrich, promised a "Common Sense Legal Reform Act" to
do away with many tort remedies,93 as part of its Contract with
America that also would amend the Constitution to require a
balanced budget to make further government expenditures less
likely, and would reshape the regulatory process to make it more
difficult for administrative agencies to prevent environmental harm,
dangerous workplaces, and shoddy or harmful consumer products.
" The wealth and income gap between the richest and poorest
segments of American society has widened.
" A Democratic President and a Republican Congress agree on the
principle and the method to "end welfare as we know it."
" Legislative tort reform has decreased the ability of victims of
careless manufacturers, physicians, accountants, securities brokers,
and other tortfeasors to recover for their injuries.
* In both the academic and the popular literature, there is a new
emphasis on "responsibilities" instead of "rights."'94
92. Cf Phillips, supra note 45, at 1270-75 (possible "charitable" explanations for Restatement
Reporters' rejection of strict liability will not withstand scrutiny).
93. The Congress passed, but the President vetoed the Common Sense Legal Reform Act. See
H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996).
94. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
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" Legislation, judicial decisions, and referenda have limited
affirmative action and other remedies for racial injustice.
" The idea has gained favor that there are "Simple Rules for a
Complex World,"'95 rules that almost uniformly involve politically
conservative policies.
Seen in this light, the relatively trivial problem of excluding liability for
breach of implied warranty causing personal injury is part of a larger picture.
What is going on in this area is part of the effort to limit the legal liability of
businesses and other major societal actors; more broadly, the effort is to limit
the responsibility that institutions and individuals in society owe to each
other. The effort also aims to limit the ability of the courts to establish
reasonable standards of behavior in the commercial as well as the social
realms; more broadly, the effort seeks to limit the ability of the people
through collective action by government to remedy social injustice.
DISCOURSE (1991).
95. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
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